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Abstract
We consider cost sharing problems with variable demands of heterogeneous goods. We study the
compatibility of two axioms imposed on cost sharing methods: ordinality and average cost pricing
for homogeneous (ACPH) goods. We generalize the ordinal proportional method (OPM) for the
two-agent case, Sprumont [Journal of Economic Theory 81 (1998) 126–162] to arbitrary number
of agents.
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1. Introduction
This paper studies the compatibility of two axioms: ordinality and average cost pricing
for homogeneous goods (ACPH), on cost sharing methods. In the two-agent cost sharing
problem, Sprumont (1998) has defined a cost sharing method called ordinal proportional
method (OPM) that satisfies these two axioms. We ask if these two axioms are still com-
patible by cost sharing methods for cost sharing problems with more than two agents. To
answer this question, we generalize the OPM from the two-agent case to the case with any
finite number of agents. For this purpose, we study a special integral equation system. Our
generalization of OPM depends on the existence and the uniqueness of the solution of this
equation system.
We consider essentially the same cost sharing model that has been considered in the large
literature on the well-known Aumann–Shapley pricing method (A–S) (Billera et al., 1978;
Billera and Heath, 1982; Mirman and Tauman, 1982; Samet and Tauman, 1982). In this
model, a cost function summarizes the minimum production cost for each demand vector,
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which is a list of quantities representing the demand for each good. Goods are perfectly
divisible. Given a demand vector, the total cost must be attributed to these goods. Examples
of such cost sharing problem are plenty (see the references in the survey Moulin, 1999).
As is well-known (e.g. Billera and Heath, 1982; Samet and Tauman, 1982), the A–S
method satisfies the axioms of additivity (w.r.t. the cost function), dummy (zero price for
the dummy good whose marginal cost is always zero), scale invariance (SI) (invariance w.r.t.
any re-scaling of the units of the goods), and ACPH (coinciding with the average cost pricing
when goods are homogeneous). Recently, Moulin (1995) and other authors (Friedman and
Moulin, 1999; Moulin and Shenker, 1992; Sprumont, 1998) criticize the A–S by pointing
out that it violates Demand Monotonicity (no agent should pay less when his demand
increases), and propose alternative cost sharing methods. Sprumont (1998) further points
out that the A–S, although it is scale invariant, is not ordinal. The ordinality axiom requires
that cost shares be invariant with any increasing transformations of the measurement of the
goods. Clearly, it is stronger than the scale invariance axiom.
The ordinality axiom and the ACPH are, in fact, not compatible in the realm of addi-
tive methods satisfying the dummy axiom (Friedman and Moulin, 1999; Sprumont, 1998).
The additivity and dummy axioms, first introduced by Shapley (1953) in the cooperative
game theory, have been the two fundamental axioms in the axiomatic cost sharing literature
(Billera and Heath, 1982; Friedman and Moulin, 1999; Haimanko, 1998; Moulin, 1999;
Wang, 1999). In the meantime, additivity has limited the scope of potential meaningful
methods and even become the source of many impossibility results or incompatibilities
between compelling axioms (the incompatibility between ordinality and ACPH is an ex-
ample; for more examples, see Friedman and Moulin, 1999; Moulin, 1999). Recently, there
has been a growing interest in dropping the additivity axiom and looking for nonadditive
methods, which may reconcile the conflicts or recover the compatibilities between some
compelling axioms (e.g. Koster et al., 1998; Sprumont, 1998). This paper is in line with the
study of nonadditive methods. Particularly, we show that ordinality and ACPH are compat-
ible through the (nonadditive) OPM for cost sharing problems with any finite number of
agents.
2. The model
Let n be a positive integer. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of agents (or goods). A demand
vector q is a vector in RN+ . Let C0 be the set of functions C : RN+ → R+ which are
nondecreasing (t ≤ t ′ ⇒ C(t) ≤ C(t ′) for all t, t ′ ∈ RN+ ) and satisfy C(0) = 0. A cost
function is an element in C0. If the first-order partial derivative of C ∈ C0 with respect to its
ith argument exists at t ∈ RN+ , we denote it by ∂iC(t).1 Denote C1 the set of all continuously
differentiable functions in C0 and C2 those that are twice continuously differentiable. Denote
C a subset of C0.
A problem is a pair (q;C), where q is a demand vector and C is a cost function. Given a
problem (q;C), a solution of the problem is a vector (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ RN+ such that
∑n
1 xi =
C(q). A method x is a mapping that associates with each problem (q;C) a solution x(q;C).
1 If ti = 0, it is understood that ∂iC(t) stands for the right-hand derivative.
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We call a cost function C homogeneous if there is a mapping c : R+ → R+ such that
C(q) = c
(∑
i∈N
qi
)
, q ∈ Rn+.
Call a problem (q;C) homogeneous if the cost function C is homogeneous.
3. Two axioms
3.1. Average cost pricing for homogeneous goods
We say a method x satisfies the ACPH axiom if
xi(q;C) = qi∑n
j=1 qj
C(q), i = 1, . . . , n
whenever the problem (q;C) is homogeneous.
We say a method is an average cost extension if it satisfies ACPH.
The Aumann–Shapley (A–S) pricing method (Billera et al., 1978; Billera and Heath,
1982; Samet and Tauman, 1982; Tauman, 1988) is an average cost extension:
xASi (q, C) = qi
∫ 1
0
∂iC(tq) dt, i = 1, . . . , n. (1)
In fact, the A–S is the unique average cost extension within the family of additive meth-
ods. More precisely, the A–S is characterized by the axioms of additivity, dummy, scale
invariance (SI), and ACPH (Billera et al., 1978; Billera and Heath, 1982; Samet and
Tauman, 1982; Tauman, 1988), where additivity and dummy are the two classical axioms
of Shapley (1953), and SI is a property of “measurement invariance” with respect to the
“linear transformations” of the measurement units. We restate them as follows.
Additivity: For every q ∈ RN+ and C1, C2 ∈ C,
x(q;C1 + C2) = x(q;C1)+ x(q;C2).
Dummy: Given (q;C). For any i = 1, . . . , n, if ∂iC(t) = 0, ∀ t ∈ RN+ , then
xi(q;C) = 0.
Scale invariance: For any (q;C) and any r ∈ RN+ , r  0,
x(q;C) = x((r1q1, . . . , rnqn);Cr)
where Cr(t) = C((1/r1)t1, . . . , (1/rn)tn), t ∈ RN+ .
The following nonadditive method, called proportionally adjusted marginal pricing
(PAMP) method is also an average cost extension:
xi(q;C) = ∂iC(q)qi∑n
j=1 ∂jC(q)qj
C(q), i = 1, . . . , n
and satisfies SI.
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However, the example2 below shows that both the A–S and the PAMP are not independent
of the “nonlinear transformations” of the methods of measuring the goods.
Consider the cost function
C(t1, t2) = t1 +
√
t2 + t1
√
t2,
where t1, t2 represent the distance from two locations, A and B, to a destination D, and
function C represents the cost (e.g. time) of travelling from these two locations to the
destination.
Consider the problem ((1, 1);C) first.
(1) By the A–S method, A and B’s cost shares are
xASA ((1, 1);C) = 53 and xASB ((1, 1);C) = 43 .
(2) By the PAMP, A and B’s cost shares are
xPAMPA ((1, 1);C) = 2 and xPAMPB ((1, 1);C) = 1.
Now suppose that we use time instead of distance as the measurement unit of the variables
t1, t2, and the cost function accordingly changes to
C˜(t1, t2) = t1 + t2 + t1t2.
Re-calculate A and B’s cost shares, we then have
(1′) by the A–S method
xASA ((1, 1); C˜) = 32 and xASB ((1, 1); C˜) = 32 .
(2′) by the PAMP
xPAMPA ((1, 1); C˜) = 32 and xPAMPB ((1, 1); C˜) = 32 .
Therefore, the A–S and the PAMP are not fully independent of the measurement units of
the goods, although they both satisfy SI.
To rule out this “measurement dependence”, we impose the ordinality axiom given in the
following sections.
3.2. Ordinality
For completeness, we restate here the definition of ordinality first proposed by Sprumont
(1998).
Given the domain C. Let f = (f1, . . . , fn), where f (t) = (f1(t1), . . . , fn(tn)), t =
(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ RN+ and each fi is a bijection from R+ onto itself. For each cost function C
in C, define Cf : Rn+ → R+ by
Cf (t) = C(f (t)) for all t ∈ Rn+.
2 This example is taken from Sprumont (1998).
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Call f an ordinal transformation if C is closed under it, i.e.
Cf ∈ C for all C ∈ C.
We can easily check that when C = C1 a bijection f is an ordinal transformation if and only
if it is increasing and continuously differentiable.
Call two problems (q;C) and (q ′;C′) ordinally equivalent if there exists an ordinal
transformation f such that
C′ = Cf and q = f (q ′).
We say a cost sharing method ordinal if it satisfies the following axiom.
Ordinality: If (q;C) and (q ′;C′) are two ordinally equivalent problems, then x(q;C) =
x(q ′;C′).
Note that if the ordinal transformation is linear, i.e.
f (t) = (λ1t1, . . . , λntn), (λ1, . . . , λn) 0,
ordinality becomes SI.
As we have shown in the preceding example, both the A–S and the PAMP are not ordinal.
4. Ordinal proportional method
In this section, we assume that all cost functions are twice continuously differentiable,
i.e. we consider the domain C2.
We say that a problem (q;C) is proportionally normalized (Sprumont, 1998) if
∂iC(rq) = 1, 0 ≤ r ≤ +∞, i = 1, . . . , n. (2)
If (q;C) is proportionally normalized, then we apply the average cost pricing for the solution
of the problem, i.e.
xi(q;C) = qi∑
i∈N qj
C(q), i = 1, . . . , n.
Definition 1. For any given problem (q;C), if (q∗;C∗) is its proportionally normalized
problem, then define x(q;C) by
xi(q;C) =
q∗i∑
j∈N q∗j
C∗(q∗) = q
∗
i∑
j∈N q∗j
C(q), i = 1, . . . , n,
and call x ordinal proportional method.
An immediate question is: Can any problem be proportionally normalized? The following
example says no.
Example 1. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, q = (1, 1, 1), and
C(t1, t2, t3) = t1 + t2, (t1, t2, t3) ∈ RN+ .
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Since ∂3C(t1, t2, t3) = 0, ∀ (t1, t2, t3) ∈ RN+ , problem (q;C) cannot be proportionally
normalized.
Now we ask under what condition(s) can we guarantee that a problem always has a unique
proportional normalization? Our main theorem below provides such “sufficient conditions”.
Formally, consider the following question. Given a problem (q;C), under what condi-
tion does there exist a unique pair of q∗ and f , where q∗ = (q∗1 , . . . , q∗n) and f (λ) =
(f1(λ1), . . . , fn(λn)) such that (q;C) is ordinally equivalent to (q∗; C∗) by the ordinal
transformation f , and (q∗; C∗) is proportionally normalized, i.e.

∂C(f (sq∗))
∂qi
f ′i (sq∗i ) = 1, s ∈ (0,+∞), i = 1, . . . , n,
f (0) = 0,
f (q∗) = q.
Let x(s) = (x1(s), . . . , xn(s)) := (f1(sq∗1), . . . , fn(sq∗n)) and consider the following gen-
eralized initial value problem:

x˙i (s) =
q∗i
∂iC(x(s))
, s ∈ (0,+∞), i = 1, . . . , n,
x(0) = 0,
x(1) = q.
(3)
For a given q∗, the initial value problem
 x˙i (s) =
q∗i
∂iC(x(s))
, s ∈ (0,+∞), i = 1, . . . , n
x(0) = 0
is equivalent to the following integral equation problem:
xi(s) = q∗i
∫ s
0
1
∂iC(x(t))
dt, s ∈ (0,+∞), i = 1, . . . , n.
By the condition x(1) = q, the question becomes the existence and uniqueness of the
solution to the following integral equation problem:
xi(s) = qi∫ 1
0 [1/∂iC(x(t))] dt
∫ s
0
1
∂iC(x(t))
dt, s ∈ (0,+∞), i = 1, . . . , n. (4)
Without loss of generality, in the following discussion we always assume that C has been
extended on the whole space Rn.
Theorem 1. Given a problem (q;C). Assume that q  0, and the cost function C is twice
continuously differentiable, and there exist positive constants a(C), b(C), and d(C), where
d(C) <
1
2‖q‖
a2(C)
b(C)
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(where ‖q‖ = maxi∈N |qi |) such that
a(C) ≤ ∂iC(t) ≤ b(C), t ∈ RN+ , i = 1, . . . , n,
and
n∑
j=1
|∂2ijC(t)| ≤ d(C), t ∈ RN+ , i = 1, . . . , n.
Then the following equation has a unique solution:
xi(s) = qi∫ 1
0 [1/∂iC(x(t))] dt
∫ s
0
1
∂iC(x(t))
dt, s ∈ (0,+∞), i = 1, . . . , n. (5)
In other words, the problem (q;C) can be uniquely proportionally normalized through an
ordinal transformation.
Proof. The proof is divided into three steps.
Step 1. First, we show the existence of a vector function x(s) = (x1(s), . . . , xn(s)) that
satisfies Eq. (5) on [0,M], where M > 0.
Let
X=C([0,M];Rn)
= {x(s) = (x1(s), . . . , xn(s))|xi(s)(i = 1, . . . , n) : [0,M] → R continuous}.
Define norm ‖x‖ = max1≤i≤nmax0≤s≤M |xi(s)|. Then X is a Banach space with respect
to this norm.
Define the mapping T : X → X by
(Tx)(s) :=
(
qi∫ 1
0 [1/∂1C(x(t))] dt
∫ s
0
1
∂1C(x(t))
dt, . . . ,
qn∫ 1
0 [1/∂nC(x(t))] dt
×
∫ s
0
1
∂nC(x(t))
dt
)
, s ∈ [0,M].
It is obvious that T is continuous and by the Arzelá–Ascoli theorem (Kantorovich and
Akilov, 1964), it is also compact (we omit the detail).
Denote
r = max
{
1,
b(C)
a(C)
M‖q‖
}
.
Since
‖Tx‖ = max
1≤i≤n
max
0≤s≤M
|(Tx)i(s)| ≤ b(C)
a(C)
M‖q‖ ≤ r,
all the solutions of Eq. (5) (on [0,M]) satisfy
‖x‖ ≤ r.
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Consider the ball B¯(0, r) = {x ∈ X|‖x‖ ≤ r} of X. Then T B¯(0, r) ⊆ B¯(0, r). Since T
is a continuous compact mapping, by the Schauder fixed-point theorem T has at least one
fixed-point x in B¯(0, r), and a fixed-point x is a solution of Eq. (5).
Step 2. Now we show that any solution of Eq. (5) on the finite interval [0,M] (M ≥ 1)
can be uniquely extended on [0,+∞).
Suppose that x(s) is a solution of Eq. (5) on [0, 1] (its existence is from Step 1), consider
the following revised initial value problem.

˙¯xi(s) = qi∫ 1
0 [1/∂iC(x(t))] dt
1
∂iC(x¯(s))
, i = 1, . . . , n
x¯(s0) = ξ, s0 ≥ 0.
(6)
It is standard that whenC is twice continuously differentiable, for any given ξ , the solution
to the above problem is locally unique (see Corduneanu, 1977). On the other hand, by the
same argument as in Step 1, we can show that for arbitrary M ≥ 1, the relatively simpler
problem

˙¯xi(s) = qi∫ 1
0 [1/∂iC(x(t))] dt
1
∂iC(x¯(s))
, i = 1, . . . , n
x¯(0) = 0
(7)
has at least one solution x¯ defined on [0,M].
Thus, by combining the above two facts, we can deduce that Eq. (7) has a unique solution
x¯ defined on [0,+∞) and it is obvious that
x¯(s) = x(s), s ∈ [0, 1].
Step 3. Now we show the uniqueness of the solution of Eq. (5). From Steps 1 and 2, we
only need to consider the uniqueness of the solution of Eq. (5) on [0, 1].
Let space X and operator T be the same space and operator as defined in Step 1 (M = 1).
It is easy to check that now the solution of Eq. (5) satisfies
‖x‖ ≤ ‖q‖.
For any g, h ∈ X, consider Gaˆteaux differential of T at g as follows:
(T ′(g)h)(s)= d
dθ
T (g + θh)(s)
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
=
(
d
dθ
[
q1∫ 1
0 [1/∂1C(g + θh)] dt
∫ s
0
1
∂1C(g + θh) dt
]∣∣∣∣∣
θ=0
, . . . ,
× d
dθ
[
qn∫ 1
0 [1/∂nC(g + θh)] dt
∫ 1
0
1
∂nC(g + θh) dt
×
∫ s
0
1
∂nC(g + θh) dt
]∣∣∣∣∣
θ=0
)
.
Y.-T. Wang, D. Zhu / Journal of Mathematical Economics 37 (2002) 215–230 223
Compute the first component only, i.e.
d
dθ
[
q1∫ 1
0 [1/∂1C(g + θh)] dt
∫ s
0
1
∂1C(g + θh) dt
]∣∣∣∣∣
θ=0
=
([
d
dθ
(
q1∫ 1
0 [1/∂1C(g + θh)] dt
)]∫ s
0
[
1
∂1C(g + θh) dt
]
+ q1∫ 1
0 [1/∂1C(g + θh)] dt
[
d
dθ
∫ s
0
1
∂1C(g + θh) dt
])∣∣∣∣∣
θ=0
=
q1
∫ 1
0 [
∑n
j=1 ∂21jC(g)hj /[∂1C(g)]2] dt
[∫ 10 (1/∂1C(g) dt]2
∫ s
0
1
∂1C(g)
dt =
− q1∫ 1
0 [1/∂1C(g) dt]
∫ s
0
∑n
j=1 ∂21jC(g)hj
(∂1C(g))2
dt.
By definition
‖T ′(g)h‖ = max
1≤i≤n
max
0≤s≤1
|(T ′(g)h)i(s)|.
And for each i = 1, . . . , n
|(T ′(g)h)i(s)| ≤
qi |
∫ 1
0 [
∑n
j=1 ∂2ijC(g)hj /[∂iC(g)]2] dt
[∫ 10 (1/∂iC(g)) dt]2
∫ s
0
1
∂iC(g)
dt
+ qi∫ 1
0 [1/∂iC(g)] dt
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ s
0
∑n
j=1 ∂2ijC(g)hj
(∂iC(g))2
dt
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 2qi b(C)
a2(C)
sup
t∈Rn
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
j=1
∂2ijC(t)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ‖h‖ (s ≤ 1).
Since
sup
t∈Rn
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
j=1
∂2ijC(t)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ d(C), i = 1, . . . , n,
and
d(C) <
1
2‖q‖
a2(C)
b(C)
.
Therefore,
γ := 2‖q‖ b(C)
a2(C)
d(C) < 1,
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then for each i = 1, . . . , n
2qi
b(C)
a2(C)
sup
p∈Rn
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
j=1
∂2ijC(p)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ‖h‖ ≤ 2‖q‖
b(C)
a2(C)
sup
p∈Rn
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
j=1
∂2ijC(p)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ‖h‖ ≤ γ ‖h‖.
So,
‖T ′(g)h‖ ≤ γ ‖h‖,
i.e.
‖T ′(g)‖ ≤ γ, ∀ g ∈ X.
Since T is also Fréchet-differentiable, by the mean-value theorem on Banach space we have
‖Tg1 − Tg2‖ ≤ sup
0≤t≤1
‖T ′(tg1 + (1− t)g2)‖‖g1 − g2‖ ≤ γ ‖g1 − g2‖,
hence, T is a contraction.
Now consider the closed ball B¯(0, ‖q‖) ⊂ X. Since T B¯(0, ‖q‖) ⊆ B¯(0, ‖q‖) and T is a
contraction, by the contraction mapping theorem it has a unique fixed-point x ∈ B¯(0, ‖q‖).
The unique fixed-point x is the unique solution of Eq. (5) on [0, 1] and by Step 2, x can
be uniquely extended to [0,+∞). Finally, check that each xi(s), i = 1, . . . , n is a strictly
increasing function. This is obvious since dxi(s)/ds > 0, i = 1, . . . , n. The theorem is
proved. 
The next question is: Are these conditions also “necessary”? Unfortunately, the answer is no.
The following example demonstrates that a problem may have a proportional normalization
but not satisfy the conditions required in the theorem.
Example 2. Let N = {1, 2}, q = (1, 1).
C(t1, t2) = t21 + t32 , 0 ≤ t1, t2 < +∞.
Let
t1 = f1(t ′1) =
√
t
′
1, t2 = f2(t ′2) = 3
√
t
′
2.
Then, the proportional normalization is
C∗(q1, q2) = q1 + q2,
with
q∗ = (1, 1), f = (f1, f2).
Note that the first-order partial derivatives ofC are not bounded away from zero and infinity.
Knowing that not all problems can be proportionally normalized, as shown in Example 1,
we ask: Are the problems that can be uniquely proportionally normalized “dense”3 in the
3 The word dense is referred to the standard topology on the space of cost functions. For simplicity, we fix the
demand vector. See Section 6 for the detail.
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set of all problems? In other words, for any given problem, is there another problem in the
“neighborhood” of the given problem that can be uniquely proportionally normalized? The
following example suggests a positive answer.
Example 3 (Contrary of Example 1). Let N = {1, 2, 3}, q = (1, 1, 1), and
C(t1, t2, t3) = t1 + t2, (t1, t2, t3) ∈ RN+ .
We have known that the problem (q;C) cannot be proportionally normalized. Now we
consider an approximation of (q;C) by (q ′; C˜) where $ > 0, q ′ = (1, 1, 1), and
C˜(t1, t2, t3) = t1 + t2 + $t3, (t1, t2, t3) ∈ RN+ .
Clearly, (q ′; C˜) can be proportionally normalized to ((1, 1, $);Cf ), where
f1(t1) = t1, f2(t2) = t2, f3(t3) = 1
$
t3,
and
Cf (t ′1, t
′
2, t
′
3) = t ′1 + t ′2 + t ′3.
In Section 6, we propose a conjecture that any problem has an “approximation” that
can be proportionally normalized. We also show that the conjecture is equivalent to the
feasibility problem of a system of differential inequalities. However, we do not pursue this
question further since it is beyond the scope of this paper.
The next example shows that Theorem 1 indeed identifies a nontrivial family of problems
that can be proportionally normalized.
Example 4. For any given q  0,4 consider the cost function
C(q) =
∑
i∈N
λiqi,
where λi > 0, i = 1, . . . , n.
Let a(C) = mini∈Nλi and b(C) = maxi∈Nλi , and
d(C) = 1
2
1
‖q‖
a2(C)
b(C)
.
Then,
a(C) ≤ ∂iC(t) ≤ b(C), t ∈ RN+ , i = 1, . . . , n,
and ∑
j∈N
|∂2ijC(t)| ≤ d(C), t ∈ RN+ , i = 1, . . . , n.
Therefore, (q;C) can be uniquely proportionally normalized.
4 If qi = 0, i ∈ N , define xi(q;C) = 0 and replace N by A(q) = {j ∈ N |qj > 0}.
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Obviously, for the problem given previously, the ordinal transformation that proportion-
ally normalizes it is
fi(ti) = 1
λi
ti , i = 1, . . . , n,
and
q∗ = (q∗1 , . . . , q∗n) = (λ1q1, . . . , λnqn).
Therefore,
xi(q;C) = λiqi, i = 1, . . . , n.
Finally, we check that the OPM given in Definition 1 indeed satisfies ordinality and
ACPH.
For ordinality, it is enough to check that any two problems that are ordinally equivalent
to each other must have the same proportionally normalized problem (if either has one).
This is easily seen from the following diagram.
(q;C) f
∗unique⇔ (q∗;C∗)
f  f−1 f ◦ f ′∗  f−1 ◦ f ∗
(q ′;C′) f
′∗unique⇔ (q ′∗;C′∗)
which implies (q∗;C∗) = (q ′∗;C′∗).
Now we check ACPH. Consider a homogeneous problem (q;C) and assume that it is
proportionally normalized to problem (q∗;C∗). Since
q∗i =
qi∫ 1
0 [1/∂iC(x(t)] dt
, i = 1, . . . , n,
(see Eq. (5)) and
∂iC(t) = ∂jC(t), t ∈ RN+ , i, j = 1, . . . , n,
therefore,
xi(q;C) =
q∗i∑
i∈N q∗j
C∗(q∗) = qi∑
i∈N qj
C(q), i = 1, . . . , n.
Remark. In the two-agent case, Sprumont (1998) does not use the boundary condition
on the second-order derivatives in Theorem 1. But he does assume that the first-order
derivatives are bounded away from zero and infinity, which is necessary5 to guarantee a
proportional normalization. In fact, he provides an entirely different but much simpler proof
for the unique existence of a proportional normalization for any given problem satisfying
the boundary conditions for the first-order derivatives. However, the technique in Sprumont
(1998) is not applicable in the general case here. See Sprumont (1998) for the detail.
5 But it is not a necessary condition for a problem to have a proportional normalization, as shown in Example 2.
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5. Ordinal prices
A price mechanism p(·, ·) is a rule that associates with each problem (q;C) a vector of
prices:
p(q;C) = (p1(q;C), . . . , pn(q;C)).
The A–S pricing method is a price mechanism, and so is the PAMP (see Section 3). But
these two mechanisms are not ordinal, as we have shown in Section 3.
The OPM is an ordinal price mechanism.
In fact, for any given problem (q;C), assume that (q;C) is proportionally normalized
to (q∗;C∗) through ordinal transformation f . Let
x(s) = (x1(s), . . . , xn(s)) = (f1(sq∗1), . . . , fn(sq∗n)), s ∈ [0, 1].
Define
p∗(q;C) = (p∗1(q;C), . . . , p∗n(q;C)),
where
p∗i (q;C) =
1∫ 1
0 [1/∂iC(x(t))] dt
, i = 1, . . . , n.
Then
n∑
1
p∗i (q;C)qi = C(q).
Actually,
C(q)=
∫ 1
0
n∑
1
∂iC(x(s))x˙i(s) ds =
n∑
1
q∗ (from Eq.(3))
=
n∑
1
qi
[∫ 1
0
1
∂iC(x(t))
dt
]−1
(from Eq.(4)) =
n∑
1
p∗i (q;C)qi.
Clearly, the price vector
p∗(q;C) = (p∗1(q;C), . . . , p∗n(q;C)),
is ordinal, namely for each i = 1, . . . , n, p∗i (q;C)qi is invariant with any increasing trans-
formations of the measurement units of the goods.
6. Discussion
We conjecture that the problems that can be proportionally normalizedare dense in C1.
Meanwhile, we raise a general question about the existence of solutions or the feasibility
of a system of differential inequalities that relates to the conjecture.
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For convenience, assume that all demand vectors are bounded by M > 0, namely qi ≤
M, i = 1, . . . , n. Consider a given problem (q;C) with the constants 0 < a(C) < b(C)
such that
a(C) ≤ ∂iC(t) ≤ b(C), t ∈ RN+ , i = 1, . . . , n.
If (q;C) can be uniquely proportionally normalized to (q∗;C∗), then it must have
|q∗i | =
qi∫ 1
0 [1/∂iC(x(t))] dt
≤ b(C)M, i = 1, . . . , n
where x(s) is the function in Eq. (5) that corresponds to the ordinal transformation f .
Therefore, q∗ is also bounded (the bound may depend on C).
Note that we do not have the so-called independence of irrelevant costs (IIC) property
as we do in the case of additive methods, where IIC is a corollary of additivity axiom (see
Lemma 1 in Friedman and Moulin, 1999). This implies that for a given problem (q;C),
where the demand vector q is bounded by M > 0, in its proportionally normalized problem
(q∗;C∗) (if there is), the demand vector q∗ is also bounded but may be well beyond the
previous bound M . That is why we define the proportional normalization condition Eq. (2)
on the domain RN+ .
Conjecture. For any given problem (q;C) and $ > 0, where ‖q‖ ≤ M and the constants
0 < a(C) < b(C) satisfy
$ < a(C) ≤ ∂iC(t) ≤ b(C), t ∈ RN+ , i = 1, . . . , n,
there exists another cost function C˜ on RN+ such that
1. the function C˜ is in the $-neighborhood of C with respect to the norm:
‖C‖ = max
t∈[0,Me]
C(t)+ max
t∈[0,Me]
max
i∈N
|∂iC(t)|,
where e = (1 . . . 1), i.e.
|C˜(t)− C(t)| ≤ $, t ∈ [0,Me]
|∂iC˜(t)− ∂iC(t)| < $, t ∈ [0,Me], i = 1, . . . , n,
and outside [0,Me]
a(C)− $ ≤ ∂iC˜(t) ≤ b(C)+ $, t ∈ RN+ , i = 1, . . . , n,
2. the second-order derivatives of C˜ satisfy
∑
j∈N
|∂ijC˜(t)| ≤ 12
a2(C˜)
2‖Me‖b(C˜) , t ∈ R
N
+ , i = 1, . . . , n,
where a(C˜) = a(C)− $ and b(C˜) = b(C)+ $.
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In other words, the problem (q; C˜) satisfies the conditions in Theorem 1 and thus can be
proportionally normalized.
More generally, we ask the following question: Given $ > 0, δ > 0, M > 0 and a
function C ∈ C2[0,Me], does the following system of differential inequalities always have
a feasible solution C˜:
−$ < C˜(t)− C(t) < $, t ∈ RN+ ,
−$ < ∂iC˜(t)− ∂iC(t) < $, t ∈ RN+ , i = 1, . . . , n
and ∑
j∈N
|∂ijC˜(t)| ≤ δ, t ∈ RN+ , i = 1, . . . , n.
We do not know the answer yet. Traditionally, to “smoothly” approximate a given function
with two variables, one sometimes uses Bezier6 surfaces and B-spline surfaces (Gerald
and Wheatley, 1999). However, the construction of such an approximation is very complex
(Gerald and Wheatley, 1999). For the function with three or more variables as in our case,
we do not know how to generalize the Bezier (and B-spline) curves or surfaces.
If we can show that the set of all problems that can be proportionally normalized is a
dense set in the set of all problems, under certain continuity conditions we may extend the
OPM to any problem. Again, this is beyond the scope of this paper.
In conclusion, we show that the ordinality and the ACPH axioms are compatible in the
realm of nonadditive methods for a fairly rich family of interesting problems with arbitrary
finite number of agents.
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